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Tag: philosophy

Moritur et Ridet

The dying of the light (Fluently XL)

Let’s speculate for a bit. One day, a future AI historian will be asked to describe the state of human civilization circa 2024, at the end of history, in one line. Being a clever and witty AI, our future historian will no doubt trawl through the memetic detritus of our time in search of the perfect one-liner to capture the essence of the zeitgeist. Among the petabytes of Instagram, TikTok, Reddit, and X banalities, the AI might stumble on this obscure memetic artifact: a phone camera photo of a sign hastily printed on standard A4 paper, folded in half, and casually taped to the front panel of a vending machine. Its message reads, “The light inside has broken but I still work.”

“What an excellent summary of their times!” our future AI historian might say. A vending machine in all its varieties, from snacks and drinks to the jukebox, is the quintessential sacred totemic object of end-of-history consumer society. It is the magical stand-in for the missing vendor, lubricating impersonal acts of spontaneous neurotic consumption. A little guilty pleasure for the suffering soul. A quick fix for the void inside. But! The light inside has broken. There is no ghost in this machine, so sorry. Many such cases!

This is where the unknown author of our one-liner comes to the rescue. A first-person declaration from the machine itself. Glorious! It starts by informing us coldly that something has broken, confirming what we already see. The cold facts cannot be wished away anymore. Yes, the light inside is kaput. It is so over. But then, it follows with the punch: it may not look like it, but things still work. We are so back! Consumption is still possible, but one has to get used to the minor inconvenience of the missing light.

The light inside has broken but I still work (unknown)

And one gets used to it.

Day after day, one gets used to missing bits of pavement on their way to the local shop, suburban trains breaking down in new and creative ways, rising crime, parts detaching from planes mid-flight, trash piling on city streets, money losing its value, pointless acts of violence, rolling power outages, potholes never getting fixed, sudden bursts of road rage, trains derailing, rising energy costs, all-smothering apathy, bursting dams, and collapsing bridges. Habituation to decline. After all, it still works.

Until it doesn’t. Just recently, the civilizational hegemon tried to build a floating pier on the beach in Gaza – an operation that 80 years ago, during a world war, would have taken them a day, maybe less. It took them 60 days this time, and the pier lasted less than two weeks. Yes. Apparently, the pier couldn’t handle the “inclement weather” of the Mediterranean summer. The only thing inclement about the Mediterranean in the summer is the tsunami of tourists drowning whole coastal towns in a putrid miasma of mystery lotions (now 30% more sustainable!), cheap beer, and the stench of aluminum-infused sunscreen. It certainly isn’t the weather.

Habituation to decline. Do you think a Roman mid-level bureaucrat-intellectual of the academic persuasion woke up one morning and exclaimed soberly to a servant, “Darling, I think the Empire may be collapsing!” Big doubt. The servants of a collapsing empire are usually the last to notice its collapse. After all, their salaries depend on not seeing it. Instead, bread prices rose every year, and the quality of everything worsened. People got used to it, adapted, and maybe stopped having avocado toast. Houses became unaffordable, so everyone got used to renting. What was the Roman version of the van life fad, one wonders? Horse cart life? The money was worth less and less, while the roads took longer and longer to repair. The Romans got used to the decay. They even adopted a fashionable new religion that taught acceptance, absolved guilt, and promised an imminent end to the nightmare and a better world forever after. Since everyone was getting poorer, and the cities were swarming with enslaved foreigners and homeless locals, it declared the poor to be blessed. Favela Chic 1.0. But that’s another story.

When the Roman machine finally stopped, the Favela Chic survivors naturally blamed divine punishment. The sins of our fathers! A contemporary, Salvian of Marseilles, wrote sometime in the 440s in his De Gubernatione Dei that Rome’s final collapse was due solely to divine punishment for her decadent love of theatre. Rome, he says, moritur et ridet. It dies and laughs! The lights are out, and the machine has stopped, so how dare they laugh? The vulgar allure of puritan morality always dominates the afterparty. It is your fault. Repent your privilege, sinner! Your very existence is a transgression. Somehow, a Favela Chic afterparty always has Nurse Ratched vibes.

But puritan morality is just a cope – a vulgar and banal way to make sense of the unfolding chaos. To hold things together just a little bit longer. The system is falling apart, repentance or not. The cracks were there all along, mostly visible too, but no one fixed them. Instead, the ruling class gorged itself on surplus energy while it was still available, while everyone else grew comfortable with the dysfunction, treating each new failure as routine, even inevitable. At first, people who wanted to fix things were ridiculed, then silenced (misinformation!), and finally disappeared. The masses became experts at surviving in a world of broken lights, patching things up just enough to keep the machine running a little longer. The civilization of cope and patch, with ever-receding horizons. Each new patch to the system’s financial, economic, political, social, and infrastructural elements lasted shorter and fixed less. Each new failure blamed on a transcendental force punishing us for our sins.

The final stage of decline was not some cataclysmic collapse, a giant wave cleansing the land, but a slow, collective numbness to the unraveling – a smothering apathy. When the vending machine finally stops working altogether, it won’t be met with shock or panic. People will stand there, blank-faced, as though nothing unexpected has happened. Afterward, a surviving Favela Chic enjoyer will proclaim a variation of moritur et ridet against those who still dare hope. It’s almost cozy in a Nurse Ratched afterparty way.

In his Collapse of Complex Societies, Joseph Tainter argues that collapse occurs when the costs of maintaining complex infrastructure exceed the benefits, leading to a decline in social, economic, and institutional complexity. In other words, collapse occurs when a complex system enters the Red Queen Trap, and all energy available to it is insufficient to maintain its current level of complexity. What people experience as the profound decay of everything around them is actually a forced system-wide reduction of complexity. Faced with the Red Queen Trap, the system’s decision center invariably opts for a controlled system-wide readjustment to the reduced energy input.

Ironically, however, this reduction in complexity is matched by the deterioration of the system’s internal coherence, itself a fractal image of the complex whole. As more and more subsystems grind to a halt and are discarded, there goes internal coherence and, with it, social trust. First, social courtesy disappears, from office collegiality to greeting strangers with a smile and letting cars merge in front of you on the freeway. Then goes every other form of social trust. As trust disappears, micro transactions you used to treat as a non-negotiable aspect of the social fabric become very much negotiable. Suddenly, you realize that between the cashier, traffic police, doctors, neighbors, and politicians, you cannot trust anyone. Sartre was right all along; hell is indeed other people! There is more.

The lower the trust within a given social system, the higher its transaction costs. Paradoxically, the members of the collapsing society experience the reduction of complexity at the macro level as a dramatic rise of complexity at the micro level. Transactions whose integrity was guaranteed by the old macro system suddenly find themselves open to negotiation. Hospital care is still free, sure, but if you want it now, as opposed to sometime in the indefinite future, you need to pay under the table to the nice doctor who never stops smiling.

But let’s rewind a bit. Like all systems, societies develop complex structures in response to the obstacles they face during their initial expansion. Each complex solution leads to another in a self-reinforcing loop of growth and problem-solving. What begins as a simple social structure inevitably evolves into a sprawling network of bureaucratic institutions, rules, and procedures. At first, this complexity is a sign of strength, evidence of an expanding system capable of inventing and overcoming challenges with greater and greater sophistication.

An ascending complex society has two key characteristics: a vitalist myth of the future and the building of long-term infrastructure with meticulous attention to detail. Such a society is forward-looking and concerned with conquering space/time. The roads, aqueducts, and bridges the system builds are not just practical tools but symbols of a collective will to endure and expand. The promise of tomorrow is injected into every structure the system erects – both physical and social. The upkeep of these structures is seen as the foundation of social order and prosperity.

An ascending complex society has enough surplus energy to maintain and expand these structures. It can afford to solve problems as they arise and even invest in preventing future ones. But this surplus is finite. As each additional layer of bureaucracy, infrastructure, and procedures is added to the system, complexity increases while the energy returns on investment from that new element decrease. The further the system grows, the more energy it takes to maintain each new element.

Rising complexity requires increasingly high amounts of energy and resources for maintenance. As the returns diminish and the costs of complexity rise, societies reach a point where further investment in complexity becomes unsustainable. No more expansion. The tipping point comes when the costs of maintaining existing social and physical infrastructure outweigh the benefits of creating new system elements. Eventually, all energy the system can access goes towards supporting the internal structure of the system.

The game then shifts to holding on to what is already part of the system. We’re not into expansion anymore; we’ll be chill now. This pseudo-equilibrium may even last for a while. However, all those complex sub-structures comprising the system are subject to entropy and require more energy to maintain than the system can produce. At that point, society begins to falter, and cracks appear not just in its physical structures but in its social ones. Absent a new energy source, the system’s complexity invariably requires more energy than it can generate. Something has to give. The system discovers it is stuck in a tailspin of diminishing returns. Red Queen Trap, hello.

Collapse, then, offers the promise of a rational recalibration. Degrowth is the new growth, don’t you know? At first, it is not even framed as collapse – just a restructuring, an amalgamation of departments, an optimization of inefficient parts. We are growing in reverse, and that’s a good thing! The system opts for reducing complexity, even if this means abandoning subsystems and infrastructure that once defined its strength and the promise of a better future. However, the problem is that the decision-making center virtually never starts the reduction of complexity with itself. It usually picks subsystems on the periphery, furthest from the center, or infrastructure considered unnecessary for newly defined core functions. All in the name of efficiency and sustainable growth, of course.

I’ve described this process at length elsewhere. Internally, from the perspective of the decision-making center, this is a calculated strategic retreat. From the outside, it looks like a house of cards folding, as Mark Twain put it, “first slowly and then all at once.” Other than radical decentralization, any choice the center makes leads deeper into the Red Queen Trap. Eventually, the trap shuts, and all that remains is to subscribe to whatever du jour flavor of Favela Chic is in vogue. It was always your fault!

Returning to our vending machine, the future AI historian would probably observe that the final stage of modernity – let’s call it the global homogeneity stage – developed a profoundly religious belief in the illusion of history as an asymptote. The belief in life and history as a continuous upward trajectory. The illusion that history is the story of eternal progress. It is a typical Favela Chic telos – banal, vulgar, boring. If salvation is inevitable, it must come in the future; therefore, we are progressing towards it. The belief in time as an asymptote does not need history at all; after all, everything that happened in history is full of bad stuff we are progressing away from. The future, however, is bright! How unsurprising, then, that the advent of the global homogeneity stage was wildly celebrated as the end of history.

And since we are discussing the moderns’ utter disdain for history, did you know, dear reader, the origin of the word history? It is worth knowing the etymology of words. It derives from the Ancient Greek historia (ἱστορία), the knowledge you get from an inquiry, itself a form of the verb historein (ἱστορεῖν) – to inquire. The past, it seems, is the land of eternal inquiry. The belief in the end of history, then, signals the end of inquiry and the advent of the age of certainty. It checks out, we do indeed live in the age of consensus. The experts agree!

Undoubtedly, this is a cozy and comforting belief to have, standing in front of the extinguished light of a vending machine that is about to break as well. The ancients, however, figured out long ago that history does not operate in straight lines but in cycles. The illusion of linearity is a function of a very short and arbitrary time scale, the imagination horizons of a people without deep history. Long before our glorious global homogeneity stage, the Greeks had already mapped out three distinct scales of time: KairosChronos, and Kyklos.

Kairos (καιρός) is the time of the moment, the fleeting, subjective experience of the present. It is the scale of daily human life, where you go for walks, eat avocado toast, pay your bills, and watch Netflix with friends. People do not see a collapse at this scale, only a gradual decline. “Someone tried to steal a bottle of wine from the liquor store in broad daylight today – wild, hey?” Broken lights get signposted, system issues get patched, and all problems seem manageable indefinitely with a bit of cope.

Chronos (χρόνος), in contrast, is the linear time built from the aggregate of these moments, creating the illusion of linear progression. It represents the story of a lifetime or several generations, the accumulation of decisions that create the illusion of steady progress. It was within the realm of Chronos that the moderns rooted their belief in history as an asymptote. Not without irony, Chronos is also the ancient god the Greek Olympians defeated in the Titanomachy, the god that ate his own children. His symbolic rule ended with him being thrown into Tartarus, the deepest part of Hades. People can spot a noticeable decline at this scale – “in our time, an average family could afford a house and car on one salary.”

Kyklos (κύκλος), the third scale, is where the real story of collapse plays out. It is the macro time of historical cycles, where empires rise and fall, and civilizations are born and forgotten. This is where the illusion of progress inevitably encounters the grim smile of reality. At this time scale, the energy required to sustain a complex society inevitably exceeds the available resources, forcing a reduction in complexity. At the Kyklos scale, societies experience growth, stagnation, decline, and, if they work very hard – renewal. From this perspective, the belief in history as an asymptote, so ingrained in the global homogeneity stage, is merely a short-lived delusion. The foreplay for a Favela Chic moment, so to speak.

When viewed through the lens of Kyklos, the collapse of complex systems is not an apocalyptic failure but an expected outcome. Paradoxically, however, accepting that fact can seal a society’s fate, accelerating the disintegration it seeks to prevent. For as long as a complex system retains even a sliver of energy and will, it can shift from decline to renewal by reorganizing its structure and recreating its myth of the future into a myth that fuels life and reinvention.

In Act I of his Prometheus Unbound, Shelley writes“To hope till Hope creates from its own wreck the thing it contemplates.” These are the words of Prometheus, chained and tortured on his rock, speaking to the Earth amid despair and suffering. There is no salvation here, no miracle on the horizon, no mystery savior to come – only hope creating the future from its own wreck, the stubborn resolve to rebuild from one’s ruins. Around a decade earlier, Goethe’s Erdgeist tells Faust, “Him I love who craves the impossible.” The message is the same – it takes defiance, not comforting cope, to build hope from your own wreck. There is no salvation in this future, only standing firm against the coming storm.

Oswald Spengler understood this. He concludes his Man and Technics with the example of a Roman soldier whose remains were found buried by volcanic ash in Pompeii. The soldier remained at his post guarding a building during the eruption of Vesuvius, his commitment to duty far stronger than the imminent death he could see approaching from afar. Such was the Roman civilization at its apogee. I imagine he was probably laughing, too. Moritur et ridet. How does this make you feel?

That soldier was clearly uninterested in frequent flyer miles or a complimentary vacation cruise for two. His total commitment seems incomprehensible and comical to a civilization built around an ersatz cult of conspicuous consumption. What was so important about that doorway in the context of an onrushing two-story high wall of hot lava? Surely, he could have saved himself and lived to serve another day. Salvation from the hot lava was just a brisk jog away. But no, he had to choose to stand there as if to spite us.

His choice wasn’t about defending a meaningless doorway or adhering to an imaginary code where superiors’ orders overcome the fear of death. He simply obstinately refused to surrender his doorway to the wall of lava. Sorry, I won’t do it. This is my doorway, there may be many like it, but this one is mine. A refusal to yield to entropy, the dying of the light, even in one’s final moments. Does this make you feel uncomfortable?

To paraphrase Dylan Thomas, fundamentally, every civilization is a constant rage against the dying of the light. You cannot optimize a civilization for safety and comfortable consumption and expect it to survive. That way inevitably leads to deceleration, disintegration, and decomposition. This is not an ideological choice but a thermodynamic one. Entropy does not care about Favela Chic delusions.

When a civilization decides mere safe consumption is enough, it dies there and then. The rest is a prolonged ritual of therapeutic survival: “The light inside has broken, but I still work” taped across the face of a decaying infrastructure – a system stripped of purpose, devouring its own borrowed time.

The past and the future

Nothing helps us to better understand any given historical moment than skipping  30+ years into the past and exploring the imaginaries of the future people had back then. Our medieval ancestors inhabited a world where the future existed as part of a sacralized cyclical time, on which the three Abrahamic religions superimposed the myth of the final revelation. The result was a synthetic vision of time, at once cyclical as personified in the festive rituals of the pre-Abrahamic solar calendar of equinox precessions, and millenarian as personified by the concept of a linear and foreordained end to the cycle. The future contained a repetition of rituals leading to an apocalypse.

The protestant revolution in Europe, and the displacement of the theist principle with that of Reason, shattered both of these futures. Now the future became infinite progress. The French revolution and the Napoleonic wars stabilized this future as the dominant paradigm of the West. The only question now became that of determining where infinite progress leads us to. This is the context in which Nietzsche declared that God is dead, a statement still vastly misunderstood, arguing that the void in the future of progress has to be filled by the Ubermensch.

Of course, the entire edifice of progress and reason was smashed to pieces in the Great War, with entire generations of Western men, reared on the myth of progress and triumph of reason, fertilizing with their blood the fields of Europe. Blood and soil was all that was left of the future now. Not surprisingly, that was the future picked up by the National-Socialists and Fascists, leading into the Second Great War, which accomplished the seemingly impossible by burning the future entirely into the hellish fire of the Bomb. After that, no future was left in the West, only an infinite one-dimensional now of endless consumption. The future was supplanted by two terms – more and now – which encapsulate everything the West has stood for ever since.

In the 1950s and 60s, the Soviet Union decided in a brief moment of collective hallucination to imagine a different future, in the stars. The Soviets even sent a multitude of emissaries into that future, first animals, then Gagarin and Tereshkova. However, the euphoria subsided, a generation woke up from the hallucination, and the future came crashing down, symbolized by the falling of the Mir space station and the collapse of the union. More and now triumphed here too.

In the 1960s and 70s China was undergoing its own collective hallucination moment, but unlike the Soviets, the hun wei bin were not imagining a future in the stars, but in progress purified from all past. Like all hallucinations, that one ended with a hangover, and an entire generation discovered that when the past is gone there is no meaningful future either. It is in that context that Deng Xiao Ping introduced a brand new future for China – that of progress towards more and now. It is at that precise moment, in 1981, when Jean Michel Jarre arrived in China to perform the first concert ever by a Western musician in that country. The choice of Jarre was not accidental. Here was a futurist par excellance, representing the country to first embrace progress as its default myth. Jarre’s music was hyper-futuristic, a glorious embrace of synth-induced progress, with no visible baggage of the past. Just what China needed at that moment. The documentary-like album released by Jarre in the aftermath is an amazing illustration of the arrival and implantation of a new myth of the future into the minds of an eager audience.

Network architecture encounters

These are some loosely organized observations about the nature of network topologies in the wild.

In terms of both agency and information, all entities, be they singular [person], plural [clan/tribe/small company], or meta-plural [nation/empire/global corporation] are essentially stacks of various network topologies. To understand how the entities operate in space these topologies can be simplified to a set of basic characteristics. When networks are mapped and discussed, it is usually at this 2-dimensional level. However, in addition to operating in space, all entities have to perform themselves in time.

This performative aspect of networks is harder to grasp, as it involves a continuously looping process of encountering other networks and adapting to them. In the process of performative adaptation all networks experience dynamic changes to their topologies, which in turn challenge their internal coherence. This process is fractal, in that at any one moment there is a vast multiplicity of networks interacting with each other across the entire surface of their periphery [important qualification here – fully distributed networks are all periphery]. There are several important aspects to this process, which for simplicity’s sake can be reduced to an interaction of two networks and classified as follows:

1] the topology of the network we are observing [A];

2] the topology of network B, that A is in the process of encountering;

3] the nature of the encounter: positive [dynamic collaboration], negative [dynamic war], zero sum [dynamic equilibrium].

All encounters are dynamic, and can collapse into each other at any moment. All encounters are also expressed in terms of entropy – they increase or decrease it within the network. Centralized networks cannot manage entropy very well and are extremely fragile to it.

Positive encounters are self explanatory, in that they allow networks to operate in a quasi-symbiotic relationship strengthening each network. These encounters are dynamically negentropic for both networks, in that they enable both networks to increase coherence and reduce entropy.

Negative encounters can be offensive or defensive, whereby one or both [or multiple] networks attempt to undermine and/or disrupt the internal coherency of the other network/s. These encounters are by definition entropic for at least one of the networks involved [often for all], in that they dramatically increase entropy in at least one of the combatants. They can however be negentropic for some of the participants. For example, WW2 was arguably negentropic for the US and highly entropic for European states.

Zero sum encounters are interesting, in that they represent a dynamic cancelling out of networks. There is neither cooperation nor war, but a state of co-presence without an exchange of entropy in a dynamic time-space range. I believe this is a rare type of encounters, because the absence of entropy exchange can appear only if 1] there is no exchange of information or agency, or 2] the amount of agency/information exchanged is identical from both sides. Needless to say, this process cannot be easily stabilized over a long time period and either morphs into one of the other two states or the networks stop encountering each other.

 

Future networks lectures

This is a YouTube playlist of my lectures in BCM206 Future Networks, covering the story of information networks from the invention of the telegraph to the internet of things. The lecture series begins with the invention of the telegraph and the first great wiring on the planet. I tie this with the historical context of the US Civil War, the expansion of European colonial power, the work of Charles Babbage and Ada Lovelace, followed by the work of Tesla, Bell, and Turing. I close with the second world war, which acts as a terminus and marker for the paradigm shift from telegraph to computer. Each of the weekly topics is big enough to deserve its own lecture series, therefore by necessity I have to cover a lot, and focus on key tropes emergent from the new networked society paradigm – i.e. separation of information from matter, the global brain, the knowledge society, the electronic frontier – and examine their role in our complex cyberpunk present.

The power of networks: distributed journalism, meme warfare, and collective intelligence

These are the slides for what was perhaps my favorite lecture so far in BCM112. The lecture has three distinct parts, presented by myself and my PhD students Doug Simkin and Travis Wall. I opened by building on the previous lecture which focused on the dynamics of networked participation, and expanded on the shift from passive consumption to produsage. The modalities of this shift are elegantly illustrated by the event-frame-story structure I developed to formalize the process of news production [it applies to any content production]. The event stage is where the original footage appears – it often is user generated, raw, messy, and with indeterminate context. The frame stage provides the filter for interpreting the raw data. The story stage is what is produced after the frame has done its work. In the legacy media paradigm the event and frame stages are closed to everyone except the authority figures responsible for story production – governments, institutions, journalists, academics, intellectuals, corporate content producers. This generates an environment where authority is dominant, and authenticity is whatever authority decides – the audience is passive and in a state of pure consumption. In the distributed media paradigm the entire process is open and can be entered by anyone at any point – event, frame, or story. This generates an environment where multiple event versions, frames, and stories compete for produser attention on an equal footing.

These dynamics have profound effects on information as a tool for persuasion and frame shifting, or in other words – propaganda. In legacy media propaganda is a function of the dynamics of the paradigm: high cost of entry, high cost of failure, minimum experimentation, inherent quality filter, limited competition, cartelization with limited variation, and an inevitable stagnation.

In distributed media propaganda is memes. Here too propaganda is a function of the dynamics of the paradigm, but those are characterized by collective intelligence as the default form of participation in distributed networks. In this configuration users act as a self-coordinating swarm towards an emergent aggregate goal. The swarm has an orders of magnitude faster production time than the legacy media. This results in orders of magnitude faster feedback loops and information dissemination.

The next part of the lecture, delivered by Doug Simkin, focused on a case study of the /SG/ threads on 4chan’s /pol/ board as an illustration of an emergent distributed swarm in action. This is an excellent case study as it focuses on real-world change produced with astonishing speed in a fully distributed manner.

The final part of the lecture, delivered by Travis Wall, focused on a case study of the #draftourdaughters memetic warfare campaign, which occurred on 4chan’s /pol/ board in the days preceding the 2016 US presidential election. This case study is a potent illustration of the ability of networked swarms to leverage fast feedback loops, rapid prototyping, error discovery, and distributed coordination in highly scalable content production.

Trajectories of convergence I: user empowerment, information access, and networked participation

These are slides from a lecture I delivered in the fifth week of BCM112, building on open-process arguments conceptualized in a lecture on the logic and aesthetics of digital production. My particular focus in this lecture was on examining the main dynamics of the audience trajectory in the process of convergence. I develop the conceptual frame around Richard Sennet’s notion of dialogic media as ontologically distinct from monologic media, where the latter render a passive audience as listeners and consumers, while the former render conversational participants. I then build on this with Axel Bruns’ ideas on produsage [a better term than prosumer], and specifically his identification of thew new modalities of media in this configuration: a distributed generation of content, fluid movement of produsers between roles, digital artefacts remaining open and in a state of indeterminacy, and permissive ownership regimes enabling continuous collaboration. The key conceptual element here is that the entire chain of the process of production, aggregation, and curation of content is open to modification, and can be entered at any point.

The Medium is the Message II: craft, and the logic of digital making

Following from the opening lecture for BCM112, in which I laid the foundation for approaching digital media convergence from a McLuhan perspective,  these are the prezi slides for the follow-up lecture focusing on the logic of digital production. I open the lecture with a fairly dense conceptual frame establishing the logic of craft and production in digital media, and then follow this up with a range of examples focusing on the aesthetics of glitch, hyper kawaii, vaporwave, and Twitch mess. Again, I build up the concept frame as a shift from the industrial logic of the assembly line to the internet’s logic of mass-customization, where the new aesthetic form is characterized by rapid prototyping, experimentation, rapid error discovery, and open-process mods leading to unexpected outcomes . The key element of this logic-frame is that the openness of the process of digital making – all aspects of the object are open for modification even after release – leads to an emergent unpredictability of the end-result [there is no closure], and a resultant risk embedded in the process. This state of indeterminacy is how digital craft operates, and it is the risky openness that generates the new aesthetic of the medium.

The Medium is the Message I: trajectories of convergence

These are the prezi slides for my opening lecture in BCM112 Convergent Media Practices [live twitter #bcm112 hashtag]. The lecture is an introduction to the state of play in digital media, and specifically the open-ended process of media convergence as mapped by Henry Jenkins. I use McLuhan’s work as a basic frame of reference through which to analyze the process, while focusing on the three distinct trajectories of audiences, industries, and platforms. It is a dual-layered analysis, where the interplay between the three trajectories drives the dynamics of the process, and changes in media platforms act as phase transitions shifting the process on another plane. I am illustrating this dynamic with a number of examples, ranging from papyrus to codex and hypertext, to the shift from newspaper to radio, and of course – the internet.

Comparative hierophany at three object scales

This is an extended chapter abstract I wrote for an edited collection titled Atmospheres of Scale and Wonder: Creative Practice and Material Ecologies in the Anthropocene, due by the end of this year. I am first laying the groundwork in actor network theory, then developing the concept of hierophany borrowed from Eliade, and finally [where the fun begins], discussing the Amazon Echo, the icon of the Black Madonna of Częstochowa, and the asteroid 2010 TK7 residing in Earth Lagrangian point 4. An object from the internet of things, a holy icon, and an asteroid. To my best knowledge none of these objects have been discussed in this way before, either individually or together, and I am very excited to write this chapter.

Comparative hierophany at three object scales

What if we imagined atmosphere as a framing device for stabilizing material settings and sensibilities? What you call a fetishized idol, is in my atmosphere a holy icon. What your atmosphere sees as an untapped oil field, I see as the land where my ancestral spirits freely roam. Your timber resource is someone else’s sacred forest. This grotesque, and tragic, misalignment of agencies is born out of an erasure, a silencing, which then proceeds to repeat this act of forced purification across all possible atmospheres. This chapter unfolds within the conceptual space defined by this erasure of humility towards the material world. Mirroring its objects of discussion, the chapter is constructed as a hybrid.

First, it is grounded in three fundamental concepts from actor network theory known as the irreduction, relationality, and resistance-relation axioms. They construct an atmosphere where things respectively: can never be completely translated and therefore substituted by a stand-in; don’t need human speakers to act in their stead, but settings in which their speech can be recognized; resist relations while also being available for them. When combined, these axioms allow humans to develop a sensibility for the resistant availability of objects. Here, objects speak incessantly, relentlessly if allowed to, if their past is flaunted rather than concealed.

Building on that frame, the chapter adopts, with modifications, the notion of a hierophany, as developed by Mircea Eliade, as a conceptual frame for encountering the resistant availability of material artefacts. In its original meaning a hierophany stands for the material manifestation of a wholly other, sacred, order of being. Hierophanies are discontinuities, self-enclosed spheres of meaning. Arguably though, hierophanies emerging from the appearance of a sacred order in an otherwise profane material setting can be viewed as stabilizing techniques. They stabilise an atmospheric time, where for example sacred time is cyclical, while profane time is linear; and they stabilise an atmospheric space, where sacred space is imbued with presence by ritual and a plenist sensibility, while profane space is Euclidean, oriented around Cartesian coordinates and purified from sacred ritual.

Finally, building on these arguments, the chapter explores the variations of intensity of encounters with hierophanic presences at three scales, anchored by three objects. Three objects, three scales, three intensities of encounter. The first encounter is with the Amazon Echo, a mundane technical object gendered by its makers as Alexa. An artefact of the internet of things, Alexa is a speaker for a transcendental plane of big data and artificial intelligence algorithms, and therefore her knowledge and skills are ever expanding. The second encounter is with the icon of the Black Madonna of Częstochowa in Poland, a holy relic and a religious object. The icon is a speaker for a transcendental plane of a whole different order than Alexa, but crucially, I argue the difference to be not ontological but that of hierophanic intensities. The third encounter is with TK7, an asteroid resident in Earth Lagrangian Point 4, and discovered only in 2010. TK7 speaks for a transcendental plane of a wholly non-human order, because it is quite literally not of this world. All three objects have resistant availability at various intensities, all three have a hierophanic pull on their surroundings, also at various intensities. Alexa listens, and relentlessly answers with a lag less than 1 second. The Black Madonna icon listens, and may answer to the prayers of pilgrims. TK7 is literally not of this world, a migratory alien object residing, for now, as a stable neighbor of ours.

Teaching digital media in a systemic way, while accounting for non-linearity

Recently I have been trying to formulate my digital media teaching and learning philosophy as a systemic framework. This is a posteriori work because philosophies can be non-systemic, but systems are always based on a philosophy. I also don’t think a teaching/learning system can ever be complete, because entropy and change are the only givens [even in academy]. It has to be understood as dynamic, and therefore more along the lines of rules-of-thumb as opposed to prescriptive dogma.

None of the specific elements of the framework I use are critical to its success, and the only axiom is that the elements have to form a coherent system. By coherence, I understand a dynamic setting where 1] the elements of the system are integrated both horizontally and vertically [more on that below], and 2] the system is bigger than the sum of its parts. The second point needs further elaboration, as I have often found even highly educated people really struggle with non-linear systems. Briefly, linear progression is utterly predictable [x + 1 + 1…= x + n] and comfortable to build models in – i.e. if you increase x by 1, the new state of the system will be x +1. Nonlinear progression by contrast is utterly unpredictable and exhibits rapid deviations from whatever the fashionable mean is at the moment – i.e. x+1= y. Needless to say, one cannot model nonlinear systems over long periods of time, as the systems will inevitably deviate from the limited variables given in the model.

Axiom: all complex systems are nonlinear when exposed to time [even in academy].

The age of the moderns has configured us to think exceedingly in linear terms, while reality is and has always been regretfully non-linear [Nassim Taleb built a career pointing this out for fun and profit]. Unfortunately this mass delusion extends to education, where linear thinking rules across all disciplines. Every time you hear the “take these five exams and you will receive a certificate that you know stuff” mantra you are encountering a manifestation of magical linear thinking. Fortunately, learning does not follow a linear progression, and is in fact one of the most non-linear processes we are ever likely to encounter as a species.

Most importantly, learning has to be understood as paradigmatically opposed to knowing facts, because the former is non-linear and relies on dynamic encounters with reality, while the latter is linear and relies on static encounters with models of reality.

With that out of the way, let’s get to the framework I have developed so far. There are two fundamental philosophical pillars framing the assessment structure in the digital media and communication [DIGC] subjects I have been teaching at the University of Wollongong [UOW], both informed by constructivist pedagogic approaches to knowledge creation [the subjects I coordinate are BCM112, DIGC202, and DIGC302].

1] The first of those pillars is the notion of content creation for a publicly available portfolio, expressed through the content formats students are asked to produce in the DIGC major.

Rule of thumb: all content creation without exception has to be non-prescriptive, where students are given starting points and asked to develop learning trajectories on their own – i.e. ‘write a 500 word blog post on surveillance using the following problems as starting points, and make a meme illustrating your argument’.

Rule of thumb: all content has to be publicly available, in order to expose students to nonlinear feedback loops – i.e. ‘my video has 20 000 views in three days – why is this happening?’ [first year student, true story].

Rule of thumb: all content has to be produced in aggregate in order to leverage nonlinear time effects on learning – i.e. ‘I suddenly discovered I taught myself Adobe Premiere while editing my videos for this subject’ [second year student, true story].

The formats students produce include, but are not limited to, short WordPress essays and comments, annotated Twitter links, YouTube videos, SoundCloud podcasts, single image semantically-rich memetic messages on Imgur, dynamic semantically-rich memetic messages on Giphy, and large-scale free-form media-rich digital artefacts [more on those below].

Rule of thumb: design for simultaneous, dynamic content production of varying intensity, in order to multiply interface points with topic problematic – i.e. ‘this week you should write a blog post on distributed network topologies, make a video illustrating the argument, tweet three examples of distributed networks in the real world, and comment on three other student posts’.

 2] The second pillar is expressed through the notion of horizontal and vertical integration of knowledge creation practices. This stands for a model of media production where the same assessments and platforms are used extensively across different subject areas at the same level and program of study [horizontal integration], as well as across levels and programs [vertical integration].

Rule of thumb: the higher the horizontal/vertical integration, the more content serendipity students are likely to encounter, and the more pronounced the effects of non-linearity on learning.

Crucially, and this point has to be strongly emphasized, the integration of assessments and content platforms both horizontally and vertically allows students to leverage content aggregates and scale up in terms of their output [non-linearity, hello again]. In practice, this means that a student taking BCM112 [a core subject in the DIGC major] will use the same media platforms also in BCM110 [a core subject for all communication and media studies students], but also in JOUR102 [a core subject in the journalism degree] and MEDA101 [a core subject in media arts]. This horizontal integration across 100 level subjects allows students to rapidly build up sophisticated content portfolios and leverage content serendipity.

Rule of thumb: always try to design for content serendipity, where content of topical variety coexists on the same platform – i.e. a multitude of subjects with blogging assessments allowing the student to use the same WordPress blog. When serendipity is actively encouraged it transforms content platforms into so many idea colliders with potentially nonlinear learning results.

Adding the vertical integration allows students to reuse the same platforms in their 200 and 300 level subjects across the same major, and/or other majors and programs. Naturally, this results in highly scalable content outputs, the aggregation of extensively documented portfolios of media production, and most importantly, the rapid nonlinear accumulation of knowledge production techniques and practices.

On digital artefacts

A significant challenge across academy as a whole, and media studies as a discipline, is giving students the opportunity to work on projects with real-world implications and relevance, that is, projects with nonlinear outcomes aimed at real stakeholders, users, and audiences. The digital artefact [DA] assessment framework I developed along the lines of the model discussed above is a direct response to this challenge. The only limiting requirements for a DA are that 1] artefacts should be developed in public on the open internet, therefore leveraging non-linearity, collective intelligence and fast feedback loops, and 2] artefacts should have a clearly defined social utility for stakeholders and audiences outside the subject and program.

Rule of thumb: media project assessments should always be non-prescriptive in order to leverage non-linearity – i.e. ‘I thought I am fooling around with a drone, and now I have a start-up and have to learn how to talk to investors’ [second year student, true story].

Implementing the above rule of thumb means that you absolutely cannot structure and/or limit: 1] group numbers – in my subjects students can work with whoever they want, in whatever numbers and configurations, with people in and/or out of the subject, degree, university; 2] the project topic – my students are expected to define the DA topic on their own, the only limitations provided by the criteria for public availability, social utility, and the broad confines of the subject area – i.e. digital media; 3] the project duration – I expect my students to approach the DA as a project that can be completed within the subject, but that can also be extended throughout the duration of the degree and beyond.

Digital artefact development rule of thumb 1: Fail Early, Fail Often [FEFO]

#fefo is a developmental strategy originating in the open source community, and first formalized by Eric Raymond in The Cathedral and the Bazaar. FEFO looks simple, but is the embodiment of a fundamental insight about complex systems. If a complex system has to last in time while interfacing with nonlinear environments, its best bet is to distribute and normalize risk taking [a better word for decision making] across its network, while also accounting for the systemic effects of failure within the system [see Nassim Taleb’s Antifragile for an elaboration]. In the context of teaching and learning, FEFO asks creators to push towards the limits of their idea, experiment at those limits and inevitably fail, and then to immediately iterate through this very process again, and again. At the individual level the result of FEFO in practice is rapid error discovery and elimination, while at the systemic level it leads to a culture of rapid prototyping, experimentation, and ideation.

Digital artefact development rule of thumb 2: Fast, Inexpensive, Simple, Tiny [FIST]

#fist is a developmental strategy developed by Lt. Col. Dan Ward, Chief of Acquisition Innovation at USAF. It provides a rule-of-thumb framework for evaluating the potential and scope of projects, allowing creators to chart ideation trajectories within parameters geared for simplicity. In my subjects FIST projects have to be: 1] time-bound [fast], even if part of an ongoing process; 2] reusing existing easily accessible techniques [inexpensive], as opposed to relying on complex new developments; 3] constantly aiming away from fragility [simple], and towards structural simplicity; 4] small-scale with the potential to grow [tiny], as opposed to large-scale with the potential to crumble.

In the context of my teaching, starting with their first foray into the DIGC major in BCM112 students are asked to ideate, rapidly prototype, develop, produce, and iterate a DA along the criteria outlined above. Crucially, students are allowed and encouraged to have complete conceptual freedom in developing their DAs. Students can work alone or in a group, which can include students from different classes or outside stakeholders. Students can also leverage multiple subjects across levels of study to work on the same digital artefact [therefore scaling up horizontally and/or vertically]. For example, they can work on the same project while enrolled in DIGC202 and DIGC302, or while enrolled in DIGC202 and DIGC335. Most importantly, students are encouraged to continue working on their projects even after a subject has been completed, which potentially leads to projects lasting for the entirety of their degree, spanning 3 years and a multitude of subjects.

In an effort to further ground the digital artefact framework in real-world practices in digital media and communication, DA creators from BCM112, DIGC202, and DIGC302 have been encouraged to collaborate with and initiate various UOW media campaigns aimed at students and outside stakeholders. Such successful campaigns as Faces of UOW, UOW Student Life, and UOW Goes Global all started as digital artefacts in DIGC202 and DIGC302. In this way, student-created digital media content is leveraged by the University and by the students for their digital artefacts and media portfolios. To date, DIGC students have developed digital artefacts for UOW Marketing, URAC, UOW College, Wollongong City Council, and a range of businesses. A number of DAs have also evolved into viable businesses.

In line with the opening paragraph I will stop here, even though [precisely because] this is an incomplete snapshot of the framework I am working on.